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Afroyim v. Rusk: The Evolution, Uncertainty
and Implications of a Constitutional Principle
P. Allan Dionisopoulos*
I. INTRODUCTION
Only on rare occasions can one expect a decision of the Su-
preme Court to have an impact outside the United States as well
as on the American people. One such case was the desegregation
decision of 1954,1 since that was a promise of a new American
commitment to overcome what others described as our national
dilemma 2 It was also foreseeable that the decision would re-
ceive a favorable reception within newly-emerging nation-states
where racism and notions about racial superiority and inferiority
were anathema. Other examples of cases having foreign as well
as domestic implications include those which involved questions
about Moscow's control over the Russian Orthodox Church in
America3 and those which reflected American antagonism toward
economic theories and practices in other political systems.4 Be-
cause such cases have political overtones and affect America's
external relationships as well as the rights of Americans, both
their international and internal implications are apparent.
While there are several examples of Supreme Court decisions
having an external impact, it is doubtful that any created a more
complex problem for the United States than Afroyim v. Rusk.3
In that case the Court declared that American citizenship is an
absolute constitutional right. Therefore, the Government of the
United States may not forcibly deprive an American of his na-
tionality. A decision such as this is bound to be favorably re-
ceived within libertarian quarters. The question is whether the
Supreme Court can continue on a libertarian course on this issue,
knowing that its decision has since become a source of embarrass-
ment for the United States in its relationships with the Arab
world. 6
* Professor of Political Science, Northern Illinois University.
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. G. MY RD&L, THEA iA cAN DEmcMnA (1944).
3. Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of North America, 363 U.S.
190 (1960); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox
Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
4. Republic of Cuba v. Flota Maritima, 385 U.S. 837 (1966); United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1937).
5. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
6. The exact nature of this problem can be better elaborated
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The purpose of this article is to determine the meaning and
implications of Afroyim v. Rusk both within and without the
United States. Such an inquiry can be said to be justified by
the uniqueness of this decision in American constitutional his-
tory. For the first time since 1789 the Supreme Court moved
away from the judicial maxim, "rights are only relative," declar-
ing that the right of citizenship is one constitutional right which
is absolute. An inquiry into this decision has domestic relevance
for still another reason: There are possibly as many as 60,000
young Americans who left the United States during the Viet-
namese War in order to escape the draft. While it remains prob-
able that draft evaders will be prosecuted under the Universal
Military Training and Service Act,7 it is also apparent, given the
majority opinion in the Afroyim case, that involuntary expatria-
tion may not be made a part of their punishment.8 In addition,
the case creates a dilemma. On the one hand, it states a new con-
stitutional principle of significance to so many Americans, includ-
ing thousands of draft evaders, their families and possibly mil-
lions of Americans who may claim dual citizenship,9 that we may
within the text of this article. See Part IV infra. For the moment it is
enough to note that in October, 1969, the governments of ten Arab na-
tions claimed that American "volunteers" were serving in the Israeli
armed forces and that the United States did not automatically expatri-
ate these men. It is possible, American spokesmen answered, that
men with American and Israeli (dual) citizenship are serving. At
least in part the official American position was based on the Afroyim
decision. In view of that decision the United States may not forcefully
expatriate American citizens. See New York Times, Oct. 19, 1969,
§ 1, at 19, col. 1; id., Oct. 21, 1969, at 15, col. 1; id., Oct. 22, 1969, at 6, col. 1.
7. "[A]ny person . . . who otherwise evades or refuses registra-
tion or service in the armed forces . . . shall, upon conviction . . . be
punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of
not more than $10,000, or by both...." 50 App. U.S.C. § 462(a) (1968).
That the draft evader may be punished is claimed by the Supreme
Court: "[T]he draft evader who wishes to exercise his citizenship rights
will inevitably come home and pay his debt, which within constitu-
tional limits Congress has the power to define." Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 185 (1963). Later in this study we will consider
whether in fact the draft evader who returns to the United States may
be punished. See Part IV infra. This question is prompted by the
Court's ruling in Afroyim.
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (10) (1964) provides for expatriation of
those who leave or remain outside the jurisdiction of the United States
in time of war or during a national emergency declared by the Presi-
dent in order not to comply with "any compulsory service laws of
the United States."
9. A person born within the jurisdiction of the United States to
alien parents may claim American citizenship by reason of jus soli
(law of place) and the citizenship of his parents on the ground of jus
sanguinis (law of blood). The United Nations Convention on the Re-
[Vol. 55:235
AFROYIM v. RUSK
want to honor it and make sure that it is operational. On the
other hand, because this ruling unwittingly contributed to the
further aggravation of problems in the Middle East and created
a situation which Arab governments seized as justification for
expanding that conflict, 10 we may properly question whether
Congress should be denied the power to prescribe conditions
under which American citizens will be expatriated." Ameri-
cans may yet discover the practicality of a statement by Justice
duction of Statelessness acknowledges these two principles whereby citi-
zenship is naturally acquired. 360 U.N.T.S. 117 (1961). States other
than the United States similarly acknowledge these two principles.
10. Although the United States announced that it discourages
rather than encourages American citizens from serving in foreign arm-
ies, it also admitted that such service could not lead to automatic ex-
patriation. New York Times, Oct. 21, 1969, at 15, col. 1. The Israeli
Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, admitted that as many as 100 men having
American passports were probably serving in the Israeli armed forces.
However, he also contended that the Arabs' claim that American "vol-
unteers" were serving Israel was a mere cover-up for the Arabs who
were intent upon globalizing the war. Id.
That there was reason for concern in Tel Aviv and Washington
about how the governments of Arab nations might use the presence of
Americans in the Israeli Army as justification for their own use of for-
eign volunteers was brought to light immediately after the issuance of
official statements by the United States and Israel. In Cairo an Eng-
lish language newspaper proposed that the United Arab Republic ac-
cept foreign, volunteers, especially combat-trained pilots from the
Soviet Union, Pakistan, India and the Peoples Republic of China. This
was in response to what the Arabs condemned "as United States permis-
sion for Americans to serve in Israeli armed forces .... " Id., Oct. 22,
1969, at 6, col. 1.
11. That the Court does not permit distinctions between natural-
born and naturalized American citizens is shown by both Schneider v.
Rusk, 377 U.S.- 163 (1964), and Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
In the Schneider decision the Supreme Court invalidated a statutory dis-
tinction between these two categories of citizens. Prior to 1964 a natu-
ral-born American citizen could remain outside of the United States for a
lifetime and yet not lose his nationality, whereas a naturalized citizen
could be deprived of his nationality by residing for three consecutive
years in the place" of his birth or by residing for five consecutive years
outside of the jurisdiction of the United States. McCarran-Walter Act of
1952 § 352, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952). The removal of this statutory dis-
tinction does not of course affect the constitutional prohibition on a
naturalized' citizen becoming President or Vice President of the United
States. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (4).
Except for residence outside the United States, Congress made no
other distinction between natural-born and naturalized citizens. All
were equally susceptible to losing their nationality for any of the reasons
stated in 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (1964). The fact that Afroyim was a
naturalized .American citizen thus had no special significance in his
being told by the Department of State that he had forfeited his Ameri-
can citizenship by voting in the Israeli election of 1951. For the back-
ground of his case see 387 U.S. at 254.
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Frankfurter in Perez v. Brownell.12 There he stated that mem-
bers of Congress,
counseled by those on whom they rightly relied for advice, were
concerned about actions by citizens in foreign countries that
create problems of protection and are inconsistent with Ameri-
can allegiance. Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that em-
barrassments in the conduct of foreign relations were of primary
concern in the consideration of the Act of 1907, of which the loss
of nationality provisions of the 1940 Act are a codification and
expansion.13
II. INVOLUNTARY EXPATRIATION BEFORE
AFROYIM-PROGRESSIVE RESTRICTION OF
CONGRESSIONAL POWER
The foregoing statement by Justice Frankfurter, which was
the majority position in 1958, was in sharp contrast at that time
to what Justices Warren, Black and Douglas believed to be the
correct constitutional doctrine. Each side had a different con-
ception of the power of Congress with respect to expatriation.
These distinctive positions, however, did not mean nonconcur-
rence on all points; there was general agreement between 1958
and 196714 that the powers of government over expatriation had
to be curbed. These cases, and others decided between 1946 and
1958, suggested that a new liberal pattern had emerged in the
Court's decisions on citizenship questions.' 5
For more than twenty years prior to Afroyim the Supreme
Court had frustrated government actions in naturalization and
expatriation cases. 16 The new era was inaugurated by Gir-
12. 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
13. Id. at 57-58.
14. There were two other cases decided the same day as Perez v.
Brownell. These are Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) and Nichikawa v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958). Other relevant cases are Schneider v.
Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964) and Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez (Rusk v.
Cort), 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
15. Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 (1950), stands as an
exception to this liberal pattern. In 1940 Mrs. Savorgnan married an
Italian consular official. They lived in Italy during the war years.
After the war Mrs. Savorgnan claimed American citizenship, denying
that it had been her intention to renounce her nationality. Although
there was evidence that she had been naturalized in Italy, the Court's
decision did not turn upon that. Instead the Court ruled that she
had expatriated herself by establishing residence in Italy. Since this
decision is an abberation and has by implication been repudiated, we
need not further discuss it.
16. To underscore this point we may note that on sixteen occa-
sions since World War II the Court nullified national legislation: United
States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Ken-
nedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Schneider v. Rusk, 377
U.S. 163 (1964); Aptheker v. Rusk, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Lamont v.
[Vol. 55:235
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ouard v. United States,17 a decision not apposite to the cases
with which this article is primarily concerned, yet one that re-
flected the new liberal pattern in citizenship cases.' s
Following the Girouard decision came still other cases which
revealed the extent to which the Court would limit the power of
the national government to expatriate. These cases may be di-
vided into two categories. Within one group are cases which
were decided on procedural grounds.10 They dealt mostly with
Americans who could claim dual citizenship and who allegedly
acted in such manner as to choose the citizenship of the land of
their parents.2 0 In another case a citizen, claiming only Ameri-
can nationality, performed a deed that could lead to expatria-
tion. 21 Within the second group are cases in which the Court
reached substantive constitutional questions.2 2  A further elabo-
ration on these two categories seems required, not only to dis-
tinguish between the procedural and substantive grounds upon
which these decisions turned, but also to underscore the signifi-
cant restraints imposed upon governmental power and to trace
the pathway of the new constitutional doctrine in Afroyim.
Day, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965);
Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965); Afro-
yim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258(1967); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. United
States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968);
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968); Leary v. United States,
395 U.S. 6 (1969). Four of these decisions affected the power of the
United States to expatriate citizens (Schneider, Trop, Mendoza-Martinez
and Afroyim).
17. 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
18. The Girouard decision overturned precedents of more than
fifteen years' standing by reinterpreting an oath required of persons
being naturalized. On earlier occasions the Court ruled that aliens
could be denied citizenship if they refused to swear that they would
bear arms in defense of the United States. United States v. Macintosh,
283 U.S. 605 (1931); United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931);
United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929). This oath had its ori-
gin in administrative regulations rather than statute.
Although a similar oath provision was incorporated in the McCarran-
Walter Act of 1952, Congress provided enough exceptions to conform to
the broadest possible interpretation of Girouard, 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a)(1964). Moreover, Seeger v. United States, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) states
a broad enough rule regarding conscientious objection to overcome any
existing deficiencies in the statute.
19. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez (Rusk v. Cort), 372 U.S. 144(1963); Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958); Gonzales v. Landon,
350 U.S. 920 (1955); Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U.S. 133 (1952); Acheson v.
Murata, 342 U.S. 900 (1952); Acheson v. Okimura, 342 U.S. 899 (1952).
20. Cases cited at note 19 supra, with the exception of Cort.
21. Rusk v. Cort, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). Cort remained outside the
United States to avoid military service.
22. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Schneider v. Rusk, 377
U.S. 163 (1964); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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Prior to Afroyim v. Rusk the Court had several opportunities
to answer substantive constitutional questions. 23 That it did not
do so could suggest that the Court wanted to remain faithful to
its self-imposed guidelines for exercising judicial power.24 Or it
may not have been possible for enough members to reach an
opinion on the constitutional questions, forcing the justices to
find other grounds for disposing of these cases.
Rules of evidence and burden of proof were set by the Court
as important procedural requirements in the several dual na-
tionality cases.25  Some Americans, whose claim to dual na-
tionality derived from the two principles jus soli ("the law of
place") and jus sanguinis ("the law of blood"), faced the possi-
bility of loss of United States citizenship because of certain ac-
tions on their part. For example, a person born within the
United States to alien parents may have been taken as a child to
the fatherland. Or this person, after graduating from college,
may have returned to the native land of his parents to study.
The first was the situation experienced by Mandoli; 20 the second
was the case of Mitsugi Nishikawa. 27
In each instance circumstances beyond the control of the in-
dividual made it impossible for him to return to the United States.
And in each case the individual was compelled to enter the
armed forces of the nation in which he was then residing.2 8
23. For example, having disposed of Kennedy v. Mendoza-Marti-
nez and Rusk v. Cort on procedural grounds, the majority stated that
this made it unnecessary "to determine whether these sections [of the
statute] are otherwise within the powers of Congress." 372 U.S. 144,
186 n.43 (1963).
24. In Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936), Justice Brandeis
identified seven such guidelines. For our purposes two of these are per-
tinent. The Court will (1) answer the constitutional question only if
the need arises and (2) formulate the narrowest possible constitu-
tional rule.
25. E.g., Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958); Mandoli v.
Acheson, 344 U.S. 133 (1952); Acheson v. Murata, 342 U.S. 900 (1952);
Acheson v. Okimura, 342 U.S. 899 (1952).
26. Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U.S. 133 (1952).
27. Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958).
28. It seems not unreasonable to say that compulsion is present
under the laws of any state, not just one having a totalitarian form of
government. As long as the individual is recognized as a citizen of
that state, he must perform either military service or whatever alter-
nate noncombatant service is permissible under the law. That leniency
is not much more apparent in a nontotalitarian system is evident in the
report that "about 6000 [American] objectors-most of them Jehovah's
Witnesses-were convicted and sentenced to prison between 1940 and
1947 . . . ." C. JACOBS & J. GALLAGHER, THE SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT: A
CASE STUDY OF THE GovERNMENTAL PROCESS 25 (1967).
[Vol. 55:235
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Even the Attorney General of the United States admitted in the
Mandoli case that the "choice of taking the oath or violating the
law was, for a soldier in the army of Fascist Italy, no choice at
all."29 As long as the Government acknowledged the difficulties
confronting the young man of draft age who resided within the
jurisdiction of a state which claimed him as a national, there was
no apparent ground for declaring that he expatriated himself by
entering the armed forces of a foreign state.30 There was, of
course, as in the Mandoli case, the possibility that the United
States would declare that a dual national's prolonged sojourn
elsewhere signified his selecting the nationality of that other
state. Or, even after acknowledging the difficulties of trying to
exercise an option in refusing military service to a totalitarian
government, the United States might still argue that the dual
national had voluntarily performed the act and should therefore
lose his American citizenship. Such an argument was not ac-
ceptable to the Supreme Court. Noting the dire consequences of
expatriation, the Court declared in Nishikawa v. Dulles that the
government must bear "the burden of persuading the trier of
fact by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence that the act
showing renunciation of citizenship was voluntarily per-
formed." 31
Since it was virtually impossible for the United States to
prove that enlistment in a foreign army was voluntary and not
a consequence of duress and threats, there was not much prospect
of the Government's succeeding in expatriating these men. The
guidelines established in Mandoli, Nishikawa and the other dual
citizenship cases 32 made it unlikely that the United States could
prove that the act of an individual had been performed volun-
tarily.
Even in the event that voluntarism could be proved, there
was the possibility that the Government would not be permitted
to deprive a person of his American citizenship. In part this
could be attributed to still other procedural requirements im-
posed by the Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez
(Rusk v. Cort),33 a decision in which a statutory provision was
29. Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U.S. 133, 135 (1952).
30. The relevant portion of the law provided for loss of nationality
by an American citizen who enters or serves in "the armed forces of
a foreign state unless, prior to such entry or service, such entry or
service is specifically authorized in writing by the Secretary of State
and the Secretary of Defense . . . ." 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (3) (1964).
31. 356 U.S. 129, 135 (1958).
32. See note 26 supra.
33. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
1970]
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nullified; and in part it stemmed from the Court's reaching sub-
stantive constitutional questions in Trop v. Dulles ' and Schnei-
der v. Rusk.35  The significance of these several rulings can be
underscored by contrasting them to Perez v. Brownell,30 the one
notable victory for the Government in expatriation proceedings
between 1958 and 1967.
On the procedural side the Perez case was distinguishable
from both Nishikawa and Mendoza-Martinez. The burden of
proof requirement and the question of voluntarism had been
present in Nishikawa, whereas in Mendoza-Martinez the Court
required that the procedural safeguards of the fifth and sixth
amendments be made available to anyone against whom an ex-
patriation proceeding had been initiated. Neither of these sets of
requirements was operational in Perez.
Proving voluntarism and bearing the burden of proof were
not problems for the United States in the Perez case. In both
administrative and judicial proceedings it was established that
Perez had remained outside of the United States as a draft evader
and that he had voted in a political election in Mexico in 1946.
Moreover, in several instances Perez had formally declared to
United States authorities that he was a Mexican national. Yet,
on other occasions, he claimed American citizenship by reason
of his birth in Texas.
Perez had been taken to Mexico as a child in 1919 or 1920. In
1943 he applied for entry into the United States as a railway
laborer. At that time he claimed to be a native-born Mexican
national. He spent more time in the United States in 1944. In
1947 Perez sought to enter the United States, now claiming that
he was a native-born American national. During administrative
proceedings before immigration authorities he admitted to hav-
ing remained outside of the United States to avoid the draft and
to having voted in the 1946 political elections in Mexico. These
two actions were defined by statute as grounds for losing one's
citizenship.37 An order declaring that Perez had expatriated
himself was sustained by the Board of Immigration Appeals."
In 1952 Perez returned to the United States as an alien farm
34. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
35. 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
36. 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
37. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, §§ 401(e) & (g), 54 Stat.
1137, as amended, 58 Stat. 746. Similar provisions were incorporated
in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481 (a) (5)
& (10) (1964).
38. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 46 (1958).
[Vol. 55:235
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worker. At the time that he obtained a permit to enter the
United States, he asserted that he was a native-born citizen of
Mexico. However, in 1953, when he surrendered to immigration
authorities in California "as an alien unlawfully in the United
States," he again "claimed the right to remain by virtue of his
American citizenship."3 9 Perez' claim to citizenship was rejected
in still another administrative hearing, a judgment which was
again sustained by the Board of Immigration Appeals. He
then commenced a suit in a federal district court "for a judgment
declaring him to be a national of the United States."4 0  That
court determined that Perez had remained outside the United
States to avoid military service and that he had voted in a foreign
political election. These were grounds, the court announced,
for declaring that Perez had expatriated himself. Thereafter
appeals were taken to the circuit court of appeals and to the Su-
preme Court, both of which sustained the prior administrative
and judicial declarations that Perez lost his nationality by reason
of his conduct.41
Perez' conduct was no more serious than that of Nishikawa,
who not only was away from the United States during World
War H but actually served in the Army of Japan while these two
powers were at war with each other. Nor did his offense seem
to be greater than Trop's, who had been found guilty by a court
martial of deserting in time of war.42 Mendoza-Martinez, a dual
national, and Cort had committed the same offense as Perez in
that all three remained outside of the United States to avoid
the draft. Since Nishikawa and Trop won their cases on the
same day that Perez lost his,43 and since Mendoza-Martinez and
Cort were sustained in their respective claims to American citi-
zenship,44 there were obviously distinguishing factors in these
several cases.
The issue in Nishikawa could indeed be described as more
serious than that in Perez v. Brownell. Nishikawa not only re-
39. Id. at 47.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 62.
42. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). Section 401(g) of the Na-
tionality Act of 1940 prescribed loss of citizenship as a part of the pun-
ishment for anyone convicted by court martial for desertion in time
of war, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1168, 1169. A similar provision was included
in the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (8) (1964).
43. Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958); Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86 (1958).




mained outside of the United States but served in the Japanese
Army during World War II. That Nishikawa was not deprived
of his citizenship can be attributed to the procedural guidelines
set down in this and preceding cases.45 Since the United States
could not prove to the Court's satisfaction that Nishikawa acted
voluntarily rather than under compulsion, the procedural re-
quirement of burden of proof had not been met. The same pro-
cedural problem was not present in Perez, it having been estab-
lished in prior administrative and judicial proceedings that the
appellant had acted voluntarily. 4"
Perez was also distinguishable from Trop, although on sub-
stantive rather than procedural grounds. Each appellant chal-
lenged the validity of legislation under which the Government
declared that he had lost his citizenship. Perez requested that
the Court invalidate the two provisions of the Nationality Act
(voting in a foreign election and remaining outside of the United
States to avoid military service) which were the statutory bases
for prior administrative and judicial rulings against him.47 Trop
questioned the validity of the provision which made loss of citi-
zenship a part of the punishment for anyone found guilty of de-
sertion in time of war.48
In deciding against Perez the five-man majority directed its
attention only to that provision which stipulated loss of na-
tionality for those Americans who vote in foreign elections. 49
Congress must have the authority, the Court contended, to pre-
vent actions by individuals embarrassing to the United States in
the conduct of foreign relations. "The importance and extreme
delicacy of the matters here sought to be regulated," Justice
Frankfurter asserted,
demand that Congress be permitted ample scope in selecting ap-
propriate modes for accomplishing its purpose. The critical
connection between this conduct and loss of citizenship is the
fact that it is the possession of American citizenship by a person
committing the act that makes the act potentially embarrass-
ing to the American Government .... 50
Having determined that Congress may make loss of nationality a
45. E.g., Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U.S. 133 (1952); Acheson v. Mu-
rata, 342 U.S. 900 (1952); Acheson v. Okimura, 342 U.S. 899 (1952).
46. 356 U.S. 44, 46 (1958).
47. Id. at 45.
48. See note 42 supra.
49. An American shall lose his nationality by voting "in a political
election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to
determine the sovereignty over foreign territory." Nationality Act of
1940, ch. 876, § 401(e), 54 Stat. 1137.
50. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 60 (1958).
[Vol. 55:235
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consequence of voting in a foreign election, the Court saw no
need to decide the constitutionality of the other statutory pro-
vision pertaining to draft evasion. 51
Justice Brennan was the mobile member of the Court that
day, voting with one group of four justices to provide a majority
against Perez and with the others (Warren, Black, Douglas and
Whittaker) to provide a majority against the Government in the
Trop case. There was no question in Justice Brennan's mind
about the power of Congress to prescribe loss of nationality as a
consequence of voting in a foreign election. However, in Trop
he stated that expatriating "the wartime deserter who is dis-
honorably discharged after conviction by court-martial, lies be-
yond Congress' power to enact.15 2 There was a rational connec-
tion between making loss of nationality the penalty for voting in
a foreign election and preventing an individual from embarrass-
ing the United States in foreign affairs. No similar rational con-
nection could be offered for making loss of citizenship a part of
the penalty for deserting in time of war.5 3
A judgment of the Court rather than an opinion was reached
in Trop. For that reason Trop did not appear to be definitive as
an answer to the constitutional question. Trop and Perez did,
however, reveal a narrow division on the Court over two key is-
sues. First, may Congress enact any legislation, defining the
conditions under which an American will lose his nationality?
Second, if Congress does possess such power, does its authority
extend to all circumstances and conditions which are legisla-
tively defined? A negative answer to the first question would, of
course, have made unnecessary any consideration of the second.
Had Chief Justice Warren alone been responsible for decid-
ing Perez and Trop, he would have answered the first question
in the negative. "In Perez v. Brownell," the Chief Justice said
in Trop,
I expressed the principles that I believe govern the constitu-
tional status of United States citizenship. It is my conviction
that citizenship is not subject to the general powers of the Na-
tional Government and therefore cannot be divested in the exer-
cise of those powers.54
Unable to win majority support for this constitutional principle
in either Perez or Trop, Chief Justice Warren was necessarily
forced to go along with others who contended that the power to
51. Id. at 62.
52. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 105 (1958).
53. Id. at 105-07.
54. Id. at 91-92.
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expatriate does lie with the Government although it is a power
which is subject to limitations.
The nature of such limitations was revealed initially in
Trop v. Dulles55 and later in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez0
and Schneider v. Rusk.57 Like Perez, Mendoza-Martinez was a
dual citizen. He was born in the United States and thus acquired
American citizenship by reason of jus soli. Because of his parent-
age, he also was a Mexican citizen under Mexican law through
jus sanguinis.58  In this and a companion case, Rusk v. Cort,0
the appellees requested that the Supreme Court nullify that
section of the law whereby they were held to be expatriated for
leaving or remaining outside of the United States to avoid mili-
tary service. 60 As in the Perez case there was no difficulty on
the part of the Government in proving that these had been volun-
tary acts. Again, as in Perez, the Court was asked to void legis-
lation on the ground that its enactment had been beyond the
constitutional authority of Congress. Although the Court did
look into the constitutional issues, it went no further than to de-
clare that the pertinent sections were void, "lacking as they do the
procedural safeguards which the Constitution demands."' 1 There
could be no question that denationalization is a form of punish-
ment, Justice Goldberg announced. Therefore, since these pro-
visions of the law were of a penal nature, the procedural safe-
guards of the fifth and sixth amendments had to be made avail-
able.62 Having held that the two sections were constitutionally
defective on procedural grounds the majority saw no need to
answer the further substantive question "whether these sections
are otherwise within the powers of Congress. '0 3
In Schneider v. Rusk 64 the Court did direct its attention to a
55. As previously noted, the Court was faced with the question of
the constitutionality of section 401(g) of the Nationality Act of 1940,
which included expatriation as part of the punishment for desertion in
time of war. This provision was declared null and void. Id. at 104.
56. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
57. 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
58. 372 U.S. 144, 147 (1963).
59. Id. at 149.
60. The pertinent section in the case of Mendoza-Martinez was
401(g) of the Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, 58 Stat. 746. This was
superseded by section 349(a) (10) of the McCarran-Walter Act of
1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (10) (1964).
61. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez (Rusk v. Cort), 372 U.S. 144,
186 (1963).
62. Id. at 186 n.43. See also the discussion about the fifth and
sixth amendments and their relevancy to these cases. Id. at 164.
63. Id. at 186 n.43.
64. 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
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substantive constitutional question. On that occasion it under-
mined a historic statutory distinction between natural-born and
naturalized citizens. One such distinction was introduced by the
Constitution itself.6 5 Another was devised by Congress. 6  Al-
though the Supreme Court was scarcely in a position to deplore
the constitutional prohibition against naturalized citizens' elec-
tion to the Presidency or Vice Presidency, individual judges could
and did condemn the statutory distinction between natural-born
and naturalized citizens.6 7 Implicit in this statutory distinction,
declared Justice Douglas, is an "impermissible assumption!' that
as a class naturalized citizens neither bear the same degree of al-
legiance to the United States nor are as reliable as natural-born
American citizens.66  Because of this assumption and the statu-
tory distinction, natural-born American citizens were permitted
to retain their nationality even though they remained for a life-
time outside the jurisdiction of the United States. On the other
hand, naturalized citizens were limited by legislation as to the
amount of time they could remain away from America. 0
Schneider eliminated the statutory restrictions on overseas
residence for naturalized citizens. Mrs. Schneider, who immi-
grated from Germany as a child, acquired American citizenship
at the time her parents were naturalized. Having established
residence with her husband in West Germany and being outside
of the United States longer than permitted by statute, Mrs.
Schneider was deprived of her American citizenship. In ren-
dering a decision in her favor Justice Douglas said, "We start
from the premise that the rights of citizenship of the native born
and of the naturalized person are of the same dignity and are
coextensive. The only difference drawn by the Constitution is
that only the 'natural born' citizen is eligible to be President."7 °
65. "No person except a natural born citizen . .. shall be eligible
to the Office of President . . . ." U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 1(4).
66. Under the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 a naturalized citizen
lost his citizenship by "(1) having a continuous residence for three
years in the territory of a foreign state of which he was formerly a
national or in which the place of his birth is situated .... (2) having a
continuous residence for five years in any other foreign state or states.
. . ' Certain exceptions were made for American veterans, persons en-
gaged in religious, charitable or educational work, or the employee of
a firm which had its principal office in the United States, ch. 477,§§ 352-354, 66 Stat. 183.
67. See, e.g., the arguments of Justice Rutledge in Klaprott v.
United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949) and Knauer v. United States, 328
U.S. 654 (1946).
68. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 165.
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Since these rights "are of the same dignity and are coextensive,"
the principle of equal protection of the laws had to be applied. 7'
For the third time in the period 1958 to 1964 the Court had
nullified a portion of the national law pertaining to the loss of
nationality. These were, of course, no more than continuing ac-
knowledgments that Congress may define, within limits, the
conditions under which an American can be deprived of his citi-
zenship. And as late as the Schneider decision in 1964 there was
not even a hint of majority support for the new constitutional
principle which was to emerge in Afroyim v. Rusk.72
III. AFROYIM v. RUSK-AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT OF
CITIZENSHIP
Afroyim was within the postwar liberal pattern of Court
decisions in expatriation cases. But it was exceptional in that
it withdrew entirely from the national government the power
to forcibly expatriate American citizens. Even the matter of
voting in a foreign political election, with its likely embarrassing
international consequences for the United States, was no longer
a justifiable reason for validiating a portion of the law.
Beys Afroyim, an immigrant who had been naturalized in
1926, went to Israel evidently for the purpose of taking up resi-
dence. Moreover, by voting in the Israeli election of 1951 he ap-
parently intended to acquire the citizenship of the new republic. 73
In 1960 Afroyim's request for a renewal of his American passport
was denied by the State Department on the ground that he vio-
lated that section of the law74 sustained in Perez v. Brownell.7 r,
71. Id. The fact that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment is applicable only to state governments was not a worrisome
or insurmountable problem for the Supreme Court. Using the same
tactic that it had employed in declaring unconstitutional the segregated
public school system of the District of Columbia, the Supreme Court
nullified the unequal treatment accorded naturalized citizens. In the
school desegregation decisions the Supreme Court had to treat separ-
ately those cases originating in the states and one arising from the
District of Columbia. Because Bolling v. Sharpe involved segregation
in the public schools of the District, it could not be decided by reference
to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
Court thus used the due process clause of the fifth amendment, declar-
ing that this provision forbade discrimination that is "so unjustifiable
as to be violative of due process." Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499 (1954).
72. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
73. Id. at 254.
74. In the Perez case the statutory provision prescribing loss of
nationality for voting in foreign political elections was section 401 (e) of
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He then sought a declaration that the statute under which his
citizenship was revoked was an unconstitutional violation of due
process. This plea was rejected by both the district court and
the Second Circuit, which upheld the traditional view expressed
in Perez. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, how-
ever, Afroyim's arguments prevailed. Writing for the majority,
Justice Black rejected the theory espoused in Perez that
Congress has any general power, express or implied, to take
away an American citizen's citizenship without his assent This
power cannot, as Perez indicated, be sustained as an implied at-
tribute of sovereignty possessed by all nations.... In our
country the people are sovereign and the Government cannot
sever its relationship to the people by taking away their citizen-
ship. 7 6
By the narrow margin of five to four the Court had repudiated
the precedent of Perez, denied to Congress any power to expa-
triate an American and subscribed to a principle espoused by
Warren in his dissenting opinion almost a decade earlier.77
This new constitutional doctrine could claim as one point of
origin a statement by the dissenters in Perez v. Brownell. "Citi-
zenship is man's basic right," declared the Chief Justice, "for it
is nothing less than the right to have rights.-" An important
declaration in itself, this statement had even greater significance
as a legal premise underlying a revolutionary constitutional doc-
trine;79 unlike other constitutional rights, even those of the first
the Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137. This section was in-
corporated in the McCarran-Walter Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (5) (1964).
75. 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
76. 387 Tj.S. at 257.
77. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 65 (1958).
78. Id. at 64.
79. Obviously Professors Mason and Beaney would not agree with
my characterizing this as a revolutionary constitutional doctrine. With
respect to Afroyim v. Rusk they stated, "The Court returned to the
American way, May 29, 1967, over-ruling the ten-year old Perez
decision." A. MAsoN & W. BEANEY, Azv2nIcAN CoNsTrnoNAL LAw:
INT oDUcToRY ESSAYS AND SELECTED CAsES 507 (4th ed. 1968). What
this "American way" is remains in doubt. If Mason and Beaney mean
by this that an individual has a right to expatriate himself, none of
the decisions from Perez to Afroyim affected the "American way." If,
on the other hand, it is meant to imply that only recently had
forcible expatriation been provided in statutes which were sustained
by the Court, we have only to consider the historical record to provide
a refutation. As early as the Civil War, Congress included loss of
citizenship as part of the penalty for desertion or for leaving the United
States "to avoid any draft into the military or naval service, duly or-
dered ... ." Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 170-71 (1963).
Perez and other more recent decisions cannot be treated as aberrations,
the Court having previously upheld legislation depriving Americans of
their citizenship. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
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amendment, the right to American citizenship is absolute and
may in no manner be abridged by government. Whether the Su-
preme Court will adhere to this new doctrine is open to specu-
lation. It now seems quite likely that the Government will want
the Court to reconsider Afroyim and to bring the right of citi-
zenship within the compass of that judicial maxim which long
operated for other constitutional rights: Rights are only rela-
tive; therefore their exercise and enjoyment may be affected
by government.8 0
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE VITALITY
OF AFROYIM
We have traced the evolution of the constitutional principle
of an absolute right of citizenship from the dissenting opinion
in Perez to the majority opinion in Afroyim and have raised the
question of its durability. Whether it survives as an operational
doctrine is speculative. And yet there are various matters which
should be discussed and which might help us to predict the future
of the new doctrine. The first factor is the changed composition
of the Court. Secondly, there is a question which must be exam-
ined in light of a claim made by the Court prior to Afroyim. Fi-
nally, we must examine the decision in Afroyim against the back-
ground of recent international developments.
In raising doubt about the durability of this new constitu-
tional principle it is imperative to consider how changes in mem-
bership on the Court might produce a reversal of Afroyim in the
future. Only six of the nine justices who were on the Court at
the time Afroyim was decided-three from the majority and
three dissenters-are still there. The one dissenter who left,
Justice Clark, was replaced by Thurgood Marshall. Justice Mar-
shall's identification with the Court's libertarian bloc in civil
liberties cases might be taken as an indication that he would vote
for, rather than against, the new doctrine. That still means that
as presently constituted there are only four votes for continuing
the Afroyim ruling. Operating on that assumption we may con-
clude that the balance of power will thus be with President Nix-
on's appointees. That they are his appointees and that his ad-
ministration might seek a reversal of Afroyim are not the most
likely reasons why that decision might be overturned. It is much
more likely that Mr. Nixon's appointees might vote for reversal
80. For a discussion about this maxim and the contrary arguments




because of possible American experiences under this doctrine and
its already demonstrated impact on international relations.
Externally the impact has been demonstrated by the angry
comments of the governments of Arab states against American
"volunteers" in the Israeli armed forces. Internally the experi-
ences are still unknown. Nevertheless, it is possible to speculate,
especially by focusing our attention upon the factor of volun-
tarism and how it might affect the Court's thinking in the future.
The element of voluntarism was introduced in comments by
Justices Warren and Black. In Perez v. Brownell, Chief Justice
Warren stated, "There is no question that citizenship may be
voluntarily relinquished." '  Similarly Justice Black declared
in Afroyim, "Our holding does no more than to give to this
citizen that which is his own, a constitutional right to remain a
citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that
citizenship."8 2  Thus defined, the voluntary act might be re-
garded as leading to a definitive status, expatriation for the in-
dividual. Expatriation is not, however, final, as is shown by
Afroyim. At all times the decision as to one's nationality remains
with the individual. Consequently, Americans are now in the
unique position of being able to turn citizenship on and off as
easily as they operate a water tap.
Beys Afroyim voluntarily performed an act, voting in a
foreign political election, which was both evidence of self-dena-
tionalization and one of the statutory grounds for loss of nation-
ality.8 3 Similarly, in other cases we have discussed, Perez v.
Brownell,8 4 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez8 5 and Rusk v. Cort,8 6
young Americans had voluntarily left or remained outside of the
United States to avoid military service. Having performed acts
which thus signified expatriation, these Americans nevertheless
later sought recovery of their citizenship. Now that the right to
citizenship has been judicially defined as absolute, it is not neces-
sary for the individual to do anything to recover his citizenship
other than to assert his claim to it. Yesterday's voluntary act of
renouncing citizenship might well become today's voluntary act
of repatriation.
81. 356 U.S. 44, 66 (1958).
82. 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967).
83. There are ten separate provisions describing acts which lead to
loss of nationality in the statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(1)-(10) (1964).
84. 356 U.S. 44 (1958).




Since this factor of voluntarism thus works in both directions
and the decision to expatriate may be reversed by the individual
himself, there is no role for government. The question could then
become whether government may at least punish the draft
evader. Because the matter of punishment is one of central im-
portance, especially in determining possible American experi-
ences under the new constitutional doctrine, we should consider a
statement by the majority in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez8 7
against the background of Afroyim.
In Mendoza-Martinez, Justice Goldberg said,
Since the substantial benefits of American citizenship only
come into play upon return to face prosecution, the draft evader
who wishes to exercise his citizenship rights will inevitably
come home and pay his debt, which within constitutional limits
Congress has the power to define.88
No doubt the draft evader could have been punished before 1967.
Whether he may now be punished is subject to doubt.
If a draft-eligible person leaves the United States announc-
ing to others that he is moving to avoid military service, the Gov-
ernment would have little trouble proving that such was his pur-
pose. Suppose, however, that the individual makes no announce-
ment at all, or that he states that he is leaving the United States
for the purpose of acquiring citizenship elsewhere. As in the case
of Beys Afroyim, this would have to be deigned as an act of
expatriation performed in good faith. And just as the individual
may voluntarily relinquish his American citizenship, so may he
voluntarily recover it at some later date. There might be indi-
cations that his leaving was prompted by the possibility of his
being called to military service. Such an indication would be
even stronger were he to return to the United States after the
national emergency had passed and there was no longer the like-
lihood of his being drafted. However, coincidental events could
not in themselves prove that his original act of expatriation had
not been performed in good faith.
Whether the draft evader may thus avoid punishment will
probably depend upon whether the Government is able to prove
by his words rather than his deeds that his in fact was not a
good faith act of expatriation. The possibility of his escaping
punishment also might depend upon his being able to draw an
analogy between his case and the case of the American expatriate
who votes in a foreign political election and then reclaims citi-
87. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
88. Id. at 185.
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zenship. In developing this analogy he might proceed from the
factor of voluntarism, noting that the voluntary act is self-re-
versible. A second element is that at all times determination of
one's nationality resides with the individual himself rather than
with the Government. From these points he might then move
to the conclusion that any act of expatriation must be regarded
as having been performed in good faith; therefore, he may not be
punished for what he did from the moment he chose to expatri-
ate himself until he recovered his citizenship.
An analogy of this nature is not far-fetched and seems ap-
propriate in view of Afroyim v. Rusk. Beys Afroyim did vote in
a foreign political election, something once considered in stat-
ute8 9 and court decision as a source of embarrassment to the
United States in the conduct of foreign relations.9 0 Afroyim
might have embarrassed the United States by voting in the
Israeli elections of 1951; however, he could not be punished for
that act after reclaiming American citizenship. Similarly, the
American who leaves the United States ostensibly to acquire
citizenship elsewhere may in fact be avoiding military service;
and the American Jew who goes to Israel to aid in her develop-
ment and defense in fact may have become a source of embar-
rassment to the United States in its relations with the govern-
ments of Arab states. Whether either should be punished for his
conduct, whereas Afroyim could not be, is thus open to question.
Because of the voluntary nature of expatriation and repatriation
and the assumption that each act is performed in good faith, there
is doubt as to whether the draft evader or the American who
serves in another state's military forces is subject to punishment.
Our internal experiences, such as discovering that the draft
evader may not be punished, could be one reason for the Court to
reject the Afroyim doctrine. The coincidental events of his
leaving and remaining outside of the United States during a pe-
riod of national emergency might be no more than suggestive of a
young American's employing a subterfuge rather than perform-
ing in good faith an act of expatriation. We might well imagine
the political pressures which would build were that suggestion
to be strengthened by the return of thousands of young Ameri-
cans after our Vietnamese adventure has ended. This would
smack too much of sharing in the fruits of citizenship but being
unwilling to 'bear its responsibilities. For members of the Court
who had not previously expressed themselves in favor of Afroyim
89. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (5) (1964).
90. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958).
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v. Rusk, it would be a relatively easy matter to vote for reversal
rather than accepting the arguments of Justices Warren and
Black.
Whatever the nature of our internal experiences under the
new constitutional doctrine, we cannot doubt its impact on in-
ternational relations. The possibility that Amerians might act
in such manner as to embarrass their Government in the conduct
of foreign relations had previously been seen as justifying forci-
ble expatriation. For example, the prohibition on voting in
foreign political elections was dictated by a specific experience.
"It seems clear," noted Justice Frankfurter, "that the most im-
mediate impulse for the entire voting provision was the partici-
pation by many naturalized Americans in the plebiscite to deter-
mine sovereignty over the Saar in January 1935."91 Were there
to be other such plebiscites to decide which nation shall have
sovereignty over a disputed area and were naturalized citizens
or Amerians having dual citizenship to participate, there would
be obvious embarrassment for the United States.
No less embarrassing to the United States is the situation
in which it now finds itself in the Middle East. Embarrassment
to the United States is merely one of the problems stemming
from Afroyim. Even more serious is the possibility that the ex-
plosive situation in the Middle East will take on broader dimen-
sions as a consequence of Arab governments' enlisting "volun-
teers" to counter the American "volunteers" in the armed
forces of Israel. Both of these points, embarrassment to the
United States and further aggravation of the Middle Eastern
conflict, should be kept in mind as we consider how international
politics might force the Court to reverse Afroyim.
At the very moment that the Arab states were complaining
to both the United States and the United Nations about Ameri-
cans serving in the Israeli Army without losing their citizenship,
there was a news item from Tel Aviv about an American-born
Israeli soldier who was killed during a training exercise. 2 There
was still more evidence of the presence of Americans in the
armed forces of Israel. The Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban,
reported that possibly 80 to 100 men in the Israeli Army hold
American passports.93 The United States is hardly in a position
to deny such reports. The question then is whether it can con-
vince Arab governments that it does not condone and that, in
91. Id. at 54.
92. New York Times, Oct. 19, 1969, § 1, at 19, col. 1.
93. Id., Oct. 21, 1969, at 15, col. 1.
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fact, the United States actively discourages American citizens
from serving in foreign armies. And, of course, the United States
must also try to convince the Arabs that it is not possible to forci-
bly expatriate Americans in view of Afroyim.
- Whether the United States can convince the Arab states that
its hands are tied on the expatriation issue depends in no small
part on whether the Arab states view the power to denationalize
as an attribute of sovereignty. In Afroyim, Justice Black said
that this power cannot "be sustained as an implied attribute of
sovereignty possessed by all nations." 4 Some nations might
claim this as part of their sovereign prerogatives; however,
within the United States "the people are sovereign and the Gov-
ernment cannot sever its relationship to the people by taking
away their citizenship."95 Failing in their effort to convince the
Arab states that the United States is powerless to act, American
spokesmen will then have to resort to other arguments to prove
that there is no collusion between the American and Israeli gov-
ernments.
In one confrontation with diplomatic representatives from
ten Arab states, Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, offered a four-point
denial to charges that the United States was virtually a belliger-
ent by reason of permitting its citizens to serve in the Israeli
Army: (1) there are no United States military personnel in any
capacity in the armed forces of Israel; (2) the United States dis-
courages Americans from serving in foreign military forces; (3)
while it is probable that Americans are serving in the Israeli
Army, there is also the strong probability that still others are en-
rolled in Arab armed forces, and (4) United States diplomatic
and consular officials actively intervene to prevent the induc-
tion of American citizens who are dual nationals into foreign
military service.96
One problem suggested by the situation in which Americans
serve in foreign armies is treatment of prisoners of war and
negotiations for their release. If an American serving in the
Israeli Army is captured by Egyptian forces and detained as a
prisoner of war, may the United States intervene in his behalf?
The United States has an obligation to serve its citizens who are
outside of its jurisdiction, although there might be circumstances
under which it "may, by proper refusal to exercise its largely
94. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967).
95. Id.
96. New York Times, Oct 21, 1969, at 15, col 1.
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discretionary power to afford him diplomatic protection, decline
to invoke its sovereign power on his behalf. ' 97 If the United
States were to seek negotiations for the purpose of obtaining
the release of a prisoner of war, it would simultaneously ac-
knowledge his conduct in creating this situation and its own re-
sponsibility for serving American nationals outside of its juris-
diction. Both its own obligations and humanitarian considera-
tions might induce the United States to act in behalf of this man
who has only an ill-defined national status. But in acting as
though the prisoner of war was in fact its own citizen and not an
expatriate, the United States might invite further criticism and
enhance the possibility that the Arab states would put into ef-
fect the retaliatory program which had been suggested.
Should the governments of Arab states remain unconvinced
that the United States lacks the power to deprive an American
of his citizenship, they will find ample justification for a plan
of recruiting foreign "volunteers," especially combat-trained pi-
lots. Such a suggestion had been made in response to what the
Arabs condemned "as United States permission for Americans
to serve in Israel armed forces . ... "98 Even before this sug-
gestion was publicized, Foreign Minister Eban of Israel spoke of
the implications of Arab charges and the possibility of their glo-
balizing the war. The current charges, Eban declared, are in the
same vein as the story which the Arabs circulated during the six-
day war in 1967, that American and British air strikes against
Arab military installations had made possible the success of
Israeli arms. At the time that story was circulated, Eban de-
clared, there was every indication that the Arab governments
wanted to "globalize the war." Now, with the charges about
Americans serving in the Israeli armed forces, there was every
indication that the Arabs intended to use this as justification for
having Soviet military advisers in Egyptian combat forces.9 9
V. CONCLUSION
Since the United States has actively involved itself in trying
to defuse the Middle East and has given every indication of a
sincere wish to see that conflict terminate, we can certainly as-
sume that it also would not want to see the war enlarged.
Whether it succeeds obviously depends upon how effectively it
97. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez (Rusk v. Cort), 372 U.S. 144, 185
(1963).
98. New York Times, Oct. 22, 1969, at 6, col. 1.
99. Id., Oct. 21, 1969, at 15, coL 1.
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can work with other major powers in obtaining a resolution of
problems in that area. But the United States must also now be
concerned with how an issue originally thought to be of im-
portance only internally, has taken on such broad international
implications.
We can readily agree that the rights of Americans are too
important to leave their definition, protection and even existence
to the vagaries of international politics. Not many Americans
would argue that the rights and liberties of a people within any
political system should operate only if they do not have an im-
pact on international relations. We are faced, however, with a
problem which is too critical to permit us to disregard the in-
ternational implications. We accepted the maxim, "rights are
only relative," in justifying the imposition of restraints upon the
exercise of rights within the United States for so long that we
must now decide whether that same maxim should not operate
with respect to the right of citizenship as well. If within the
United States one's rights must be considered in relation to the
rights of others and to the legitimate interests of society, cer-
tainly the larger interests of the American people's not be-
coming involved in a hostile international situation is an equally
sound justification for reversing Afroyim and rejecting the new
constitutional principle.
19701

